The Cambridge Declaration: Did We Solve the Question of Consciousness in Animals?

Abstract

How and why do humans, and potentially non-human organisms, experience consciousness? This question has been dubbed “the hard question of consciousness” and has been a topic of much debate among philosophers, psychologists, biologists, and practitioners of many more fields of study. The Cambridge Declaration states that consciousness definitively exists in non-human animals, these animals possessing the neurobiological substrates necessary for consciousness. However, there are issues with the declaration that suggest the provided proofs for their conclusion are not sufficient to make such a definitive statement. The Cambridge Declaration attempts to influence our perception of animals and our relationships with them, and despite the intended effects of the paper being noble and agreeable – implying that animals should be treated with more dignity and respect, to make us reevaluate the ways in which we interact with them – the declaration unfortunately fails to properly answer the hard question. In attempting to remove the question of consciousness from any philosophical influences and base it solely on observable physical qualia, they unfortunately fail to properly address the question in the first place. Neither the Cambridge Declaration nor its supporting research attempt to define consciousness in a consistent manner, and in fact even have conflicting conceptions of consciousness. Additionally, a unified or majorly agreed upon theory of consciousness has not yet been adopted by the scientific community. Due to these issues, the Cambridge Declaration should not be considered scientific doctrine, and should instead be disregarded, or perhaps amended, until such a time when a definitive answer to the hard question will, if ever, arise.